PS 209 | RATIONAL CHOICE AND GAME THEORY

Course syllabus

Description: This seminar introduces M.A. and Ph.D. students to game theory and formal modeling. It is designed to (1) familiarize students with the basic concepts and math used in formal modeling and (2) to survey the contributions and debates surrounding the application of game theory and formal modeling to international relations, comparative politics, and American politics. Our time will be divided about 50/50 between the technical aspects of game theory and substantive applications in political science. Topics in game theory include strategic and extensive form games, repeated games, private information, signaling, and screening. Readings will examine a number of solution concepts, such as strong and weak domination, mixed strategies, backwards induction, Nash equilibrium, subgame perfection, and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Substantive topics include voting behavior, governing coalitions, absolute vs. relative gains, bargaining and war, and nuclear deterrence theory.

Required Readings:

1. James Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
2. Kenneth Shepsle and Mark Bonchek, Analyzing Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997).
3. Robert Powell, In the Shadow of Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).
4. Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996).
5. Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Revised Edition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980).
6. PS 209 Course reader.