

# Supplemental Materials for “Elite Level Conflict Salience and Dimensionality in Western Europe: Concepts and Empirical Findings”

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This paper contains supplemental materials for “Elite Level Conflict Salience and Dimensionality in Western Europe: Concepts and Empirical Findings”.

## 1 Conflict and Issue Salience by Country

We initially present graphs of conflict and issue salience comparable to the main paper’s Figure 1 for all eighteen Western European countries included in the study. In addition to the graphs that present LOWESS smoothed data (Figures 1, 3, 5, 7 and 9), we also include graphs that present the original, unsmoothed data (Figures 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10). The main paper’s Figure 1 is reproduced here to aid readers. These four countries (Belgium, France, Norway and the United Kingdom) lead off all sets of graphs; the remaining countries appear alphabetically. Note that for the three countries in the analysis that underwent third wave transitions to democracy (Greece, Portugal, and Spain), we additionally measure the salience of a seventh ideological conflict: a democratic–authoritarian conflict around the transition to democracy and the legacy of the authoritarian regime. The CMP coding categories associated with this ideological conflict are PER201, “Human Rights and Freedom” and PER202, “Democracy”.

## 2 Raw Dimensionality by Country

We next present graphs of the raw ideological (Figures 11–15) and issue dimensionality (Figures 16–20). The measure described in the main paper, which weighs dimensions by their estimated salience using Molinar’s (1991) modified version of Laakso and Taagepera’s (1979) effective number, is shown as a solid black line. We also show an alternative measure that uses the effective number itself, shown as a dotted black line. This demonstrates how the effective number does in fact over-count the most salient dimension and hence over-estimate the dimensionality.

### 3 More on Measuring the Raw Space

Finally, we provide more information about the measures of the raw space appearing in the main paper, which both update and slightly modify the measures introduced earlier in Stoll (2004). See Stoll (N.d.) for a prior appearance of these modified (but not updated) measures. The measures used here and in Stoll (N.d.) diverge from Stoll’s (2004) in that they effectively normalize all parties’ manifestos to the same length so that each contributes equally to the raw space, instead of allowing parties with longer manifestos to contribute more. Below, we elaborate upon the association of Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) coding categories (Budge, Klingemann, Volkens, Bara and Tanenbaum, 2001; Budge, Klingemann, Volkens, Bara and McDonald, 2006) with the various ideological conflicts.

Table 1 reproduces in tabular format the baseline associations between the CMP coding categories and the six potentially salient ideological conflicts that were originally described in the Appendix to the main paper. Many of these associations are uncontroversial. However, not all are. A brief discussion of the rationale underlying some of the less obvious, and hence more problematic, associations follows. “Decentralization” (PER301) and “Centralization” (PER302) are viewed as issues associated with the ethnic conflict because many ethnic conflicts are driven by geographically concentrated groups who seek greater political autonomy. “National Way of Life: Negative” (PER602) and “National Way of Life: Positive” (PER601) contain appeals to established national ideas, opposition to the existing national state, and expressions of nationalism in general, issues that also seem best related to the ethnic conflict. Particularly problematic categories are “Social Justice”, “Multiculturalism: Positive”, “Multiculturalism: Negative”, “Underprivileged Minority Groups” and “Non-Economic Demographic Groups”. The “Social Justice” category relates primarily to equality in resources and opportunities but also includes racial discrimination. The former should be associated with the socioeconomic conflict and the latter with ethnic conflict. Unfortunately, because we cannot parcel out the quasi-sentences related to racial discrimination without re-coding the manifestos, and because the plurality of these issues relate to socioeconomics, we associate this category with the socioeconomic conflict. This means that the salience of the ethnic cleavage may be underestimated and the salience of the socioeconomic cleavage overestimated. Similarly, the “Multiculturalism”, “Non-economic Demographic Groups”, and “Underprivileged Minority Groups” categories mostly tap the ethnic conflict but to some extent also tap issues related to the religious and post-materialist conflicts. As before, the categories have been associated with the conflict to which the plurality of issues relate, in this case the ethnic, which means that the salience of the former conflicts may be underestimated and the salience of the latter overestimated.

Ten coding categories are effectively left out of the baseline associations because we did not see how to unambiguously link them to a single ideological conflict. Many contain what might be viewed as classic valence issues. These even more problematic categories are: “Political Authority” (PER305); “Culture” (PER502); “Law and Order” (PER605); “Social Harmony” (PER606); “Constitutionalism: Positive” (PER203); “Constitutionalism: Negative” (PER204); “Government Efficiency” (PER303); “Corruption” (PER304); “Democracy” (PER202); and “Freedom and Human Rights” (PER201). The exception is for the

countries that underwent a third wave transition to democracy: Greece, Portugal, and Spain. For these three countries, the “Freedom and Human Rights” and “Democracy” categories seem to obviously relate to and hence are associated with the democratic–authoritarian conflict over the nature of the political regime and the legacy of authoritarianism.

To deal with these difficult-to-associate categories, we introduce some country- and time-specific modifications to the baseline associations. These modifications are:

- The “Culture” and “Law and Order” categories are associated with either the post-materialist, the ethnic, or no conflict in a country depending upon the strength of their correlations with the baseline coding categories associated with these conflicts. For example, countries where “Culture” both reasonably correlates ( $r > 0.30$ ) with one of the two post-materialist categories and is not more strongly correlated with the ethnic coding categories are Greece and the United Kingdom; for these two countries, “Culture” is consequently associated with the post-materialist conflict. Note that we begin the “Law and Order” association in 1960 because of its non-ideological prominence in the aftermath of World War II in several countries.
- The two “National Way of Life” categories may be more properly associated with the foreign policy than with the ethnic conflict for countries that have faced significant external threats, from border disputes to cold wars. Accordingly, we take whichever of the two associations seems the most reasonable for each country. For Greece (Turkey), Germany (post-war reconstruction and the Cold War) and Ireland (Northern Ireland), this is deemed to be the foreign policy conflict. For France (de-colonization and the Cold War) and Austria (post-war reconstruction), this same association is made until the 1980s. Because the issues in these categories are then taken up by the Freedom Movement and the Greens in Austria from 1981, and by the National Front in France from 1986, we associate these categories with the post-materialist and ethnic conflicts from 1981 and 1986 onwards, respectively, in these two countries.
- In both Belgium and Spain, where demands for greater autonomy for ethno-linguistic national minorities have been closely tied to revisions in the existing constitutional structure, we associate the two “Constitutionalism” categories with the ethnic conflict.
- In Austria, the call for a strong state has been a particular hallmark of the far right Freedom Movement; hence, the “Political Authority” category is associated with post-materialism.

Table 2 summarizes the modifications to the baseline associations. To show that our conclusions are not unduly sensitive to these choices, which might appear too idiosyncratic, we present versions of Figures 1, 3, 5, 7 and 9 that use only the baseline associations to calculate conflict salience. These are Figures 21–25, respectively.

Finally, because of the difficulty of distinguishing between the ethnic and the post-materialist conflicts due to the way in which the CMP designed its coding categories, we calculate the salience of what is effectively a combined post-materialist-cum-ethnic ideological conflict. To do so, we associate the following coding categories with this new conflict: the

baseline coding categories associated with the ethnic conflict (“Decentralization”; “Centralization”; “National Way of Life, Negative”; “National Way of Life, Positive”; “Multiculturalism, Positive”; “Multiculturalism, Negative”; “Underprivileged Minorities”; “Non-economic Demographic Groups”); the baseline coding categories associated with the post-materialist conflict (“Anti-growth” and “Environment”); and the “Culture” and “Law and Order” categories. Again, we take this approach because while we believe that a distinction should be made between these two ideological conflicts, it is difficult to do so using the CMP data: we admit that there is a certain degree of arbitrariness in how the prior coding categories are assigned to the ideological conflicts in the original schema. We then compare the salience of this conflict with that of the foreign policy conflict, as defined by the baseline associations; the socioeconomic conflict; the religious conflict; the urban–rural conflict; and the democratic–authoritarian conflict.

Table 3 presents a modified version of the main paper’s Table 1, which contains decade-by-decade estimates of the salience of the first six of these ideological conflicts for Western Europe as a whole. Figures 26–30 present the corresponding country-by-country saliences (versions of Figures 1, 3, 5, 7 and 9) and Figures 31–35 present the corresponding country-by-country raw ideological dimensionalities (versions of Figures 11–15). From this table and these figures, we see that we tell a very similar story to that originally told by the main paper. In individual countries, we observe both almost identical trends and relative saliences from country to country, although the combined post-materialist/ethnic cleavage is unsurprisingly now much more salient than either the individual post-materialist or ethnic conflicts were. We also see largely identical trends in the ideological dimensionality, albeit often with a somewhat larger increase (e.g., Norway). Hence, while the combined post-materialist/ethnic cleavage is a stronger rival to the socioeconomic conflict in most countries since the 1970s, bringing the raw space closer to two dimensional for many countries today, the socioeconomic conflict remains preeminent. At the common Western European level, we come to similar conclusions. For example, the average salience of the combined post-materialist/ethnic conflict is now twenty-six percent in the early 2000s relative to ten percent in the 1950s, versus forty-one and forty-two percent for the socioeconomic, respectively. And while the raw ideological dimensionality sees a greater increase (to 1.9 dimensions in the early 2000s, versus to 1.6 when using the original set of ideological conflicts) beginning in the 1970s, the increase is still modest (one-half an ideological dimension in total over the post-war period). Hence, while using the combined post-materialist/ethnic conflict may bring our results more closely into alignment with expert surveys in that it boosts the salience of the secondary dimension that contends with socioeconomics, we come to the same conclusions about the phenomena of dealignment and realignment.

## References

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


Figure 1: LOWESS smoothed conflict and issue salience in four Western European countries, 1950–2003 (2005 for the United Kingdom): socioeconomic (solid black); ethnic (dotted red); foreign policy (long dashed orange); religious (dot-dashed green); urban–rural (two dashed purple); post-materialist (dashed blue); democratic-authoritarian (dot-dashed maroon); valence (solid gray); and social groups (dashed gray).




Figure 2: Unsmoothed conflict and issue salience in four Western European countries, 1950–2003 (2005 for the United Kingdom): socioeconomic (solid black); ethnic (dotted red); foreign policy (long dashed orange); religious (dot-dashed green); urban–rural (two dashed purple); post-materialist (dashed blue); democratic-authoritarian (dot-dashed maroon); valence (solid gray); and social groups (dashed gray).




Figure 3: LOWESS smoothed conflict and issue salience in four Western European countries, 1950–2003 (2005 for the United Kingdom): socioeconomic (solid black); ethnic (dotted red); foreign policy (long dashed orange); religious (dot-dashed green); urban–rural (two dashed purple); post-materialist (dashed blue); democratic-authoritarian (dot-dashed maroon); valence (solid gray); and social groups (dashed gray).




Figure 4: Unsmoothed conflict and issue salience in four Western European countries, 1950–2003 (2005 for the United Kingdom): socioeconomic (solid black); ethnic (dotted red); foreign policy (long dashed orange); religious (dot-dashed green); urban-rural (two dashed purple); post-materialist (dashed blue); democratic-authoritarian (dot-dashed maroon); valence (solid gray); and social groups (dashed gray).




Figure 5: LOWESS smoothed conflict and issue salience in four Western European countries, 1950–2003 (2005 for the United Kingdom): socioeconomic (solid black); ethnic (dotted red); foreign policy (long dashed orange); religious (dot-dashed green); urban–rural (two dashed purple); post-materialist (dashed blue); democratic-authoritarian (dot-dashed maroon); valence (solid gray); and social groups (dashed gray).




Figure 6: Unsmoothed conflict and issue salience in four Western European countries, 1950–2003 (2005 for the United Kingdom): socioeconomic (solid black); ethnic (dotted red); foreign policy (long dashed orange); religious (dot-dashed green); urban–rural (two dashed purple); post-materialist (dashed blue); democratic-authoritarian (dot-dashed maroon); valence (solid gray); and social groups (dashed gray).




Figure 7: LOWESS smoothed conflict and issue salience in four Western European countries, 1950–2003 (2005 for the United Kingdom): socioeconomic (solid black); ethnic (dotted red); foreign policy (long dashed orange); religious (dot-dashed green); urban-rural (two dashed purple); post-materialist (dashed blue); democratic-authoritarian (dot-dashed maroon); valence (solid gray); and social groups (dashed gray).




Figure 8: Unsmoothed conflict and issue salience in four Western European countries, 1950–2003 (2005 for the United Kingdom): socioeconomic (solid black); ethnic (dotted red); foreign policy (long dashed orange); religious (dot-dashed green); urban–rural (two dashed purple); post-materialist (dashed blue); democratic-authoritarian (dot-dashed maroon); valence (solid gray); and social groups (dashed gray).




Figure 9: LOWESS smoothed conflict and issue salience in two Western European countries, 1950–2003 (2005 for the United Kingdom): socioeconomic (solid black); ethnic (dotted red); foreign policy (long dashed orange); religious (dot-dashed green); urban–rural (two dashed purple); post-materialist (dashed blue); democratic-authoritarian (dot-dashed maroon); valence (solid gray); and social groups (dashed gray).




Figure 10: Unsmoothed conflict and issue salience in two Western European countries, 1950–2003 (2005 for the United Kingdom): socioeconomic (solid black); ethnic (dotted red); foreign policy (long dashed orange); religious (dot-dashed green); urban–rural (two dashed purple); post-materialist (dashed blue); democratic-authoritarian (dot-dashed maroon); valence (solid gray); and social groups (dashed gray).




Figure 11: LOWESS smoothed raw ideological dimensionality in four Western European countries, 1950–2003 (2005 for the United Kingdom). An alternative measure using the standard effective number of Laakso and Taagepera (1979) is shown in dotted black.




Figure 12: LOWESS smoothed raw ideological dimensionality in four Western European countries, 1950–2003 (2005 for the United Kingdom). An alternative measure using the standard effective number of Laakso and Taagepera (1979) is shown in dotted black.




Figure 13: LOWESS smoothed raw ideological dimensionality in four Western European countries, 1950–2003 (2005 for the United Kingdom). An alternative measure using the standard effective number of Laakso and Taagepera (1979) is shown in dotted black.




Figure 14: LOWESS smoothed raw ideological dimensionality in four Western European countries, 1950–2003 (2005 for the United Kingdom). An alternative measure using the standard effective number of Laakso and Taagepera (1979) is shown in dotted black.




Figure 15: LOWESS smoothed raw ideological dimensionality in two Western European countries, 1950–2003 (2005 for the United Kingdom). An alternative measure using the standard effective number of Laakso and Taagepera (1979) is shown in dotted black.




Figure 16: LOWESS smoothed raw issue dimensionality in four Western European countries, 1950–2003 (2005 for the United Kingdom). An alternative measure using the standard effective number of Laakso and Taagepera (1979) is shown in dotted black.




Figure 17: LOWESS smoothed raw issue dimensionality in four Western European countries, 1950–2003 (2005 for the United Kingdom). An alternative measure using the standard effective number of Laakso and Taagepera (1979) is shown in dotted black.




Figure 18: LOWESS smoothed raw issue dimensionality in four Western European countries, 1950–2003 (2005 for the United Kingdom). An alternative measure using the standard effective number of Laakso and Taagepera (1979) is shown in dotted black.




Figure 19: LOWESS smoothed raw issue dimensionality in four Western European countries, 1950–2003 (2005 for the United Kingdom). An alternative measure using the standard effective number of Laakso and Taagepera (1979) is shown in dotted black.




Figure 20: LOWESS smoothed raw issue dimensionality in two Western European countries, 1950–2003 (2005 for the United Kingdom). An alternative measure using the standard effective number of Laakso and Taagepera (1979) is shown in dotted black.

Code	Description	Code	Description	Code	Description
<b>Socioeconomics</b>		<b>Ethnic</b>		<b>Foreign Policy</b>	
PER401	Free enterprise	PER301	Decentralization	PER101	Foreign Special Relationships, Positive
PER402	Incentives	PER302	Centralization	PER102	Foreign Special Relationships, Negative
PER403	Market Regulation	PER601	National Way of Life, Positive	PER103	Anti-imperialism
PER404	Economic Planning	PER602	National Way of Life, Negative	PER104	Military, Positive
PER406	Corporatism	PER607	Multiculturalism, Positive	PER105	Military, Negative
PER407	Protectionism, Positive	PER608	Multiculturalism, Negative	PER106	Peace
PER408	Protectionism, Negative	PER705	Underprivileged Minorities	PER107	Internationalism, Positive
PER409	Keynesian Demand Management	PER706	Non-economic Demographic Groups	PER108	EC/EU, Positive
PER410	Productivity	<b>Religious</b>		PER109	Internationalism, Negative
PER411	Technology & Infrastructure	PER603	Traditional Morality, Positive	PER110	EC/EU, Negative
PER412	Controlled Economy	PER604	Traditional Morality, Negative	<b>Democratic–Authoritarian</b>	
PER413	Nationalization	<b>Post-materialist</b>		PER201	Human Rights & Freedom
PER414	Economic Orthodoxy	PER416	Anti-Growth	PER202	Democracy
PER415	Marxist Analysis	PER501	Environment	<b>Urban–Rural</b>	
PER503	Social Justice			PER703	Agriculture & Farmers
PER504	Welfare State Expansion				
PER505	Welfare State Limitation				
PER506	Education Expansion				
PER507	Education Limitation				
PER701	Labor Groups, Positive				
PER702	Labor Groups, Negative				
PER704	Middle Class & Professional Groups				

Table 1: Baseline CMP coding category–conflict associations for the seven potentially salient ideological conflicts.

<b>Country</b>	<b>Foreign Policy</b>	<b>Ethnic</b>	<b>Post-materialism</b>
Austria	+ PER601 (< 1981) + PER602 (< 1981)	- PER601 - PER602	+ PER305 + PER601 ( $\geq$ 1981) + PER602 ( $\geq$ 1981)
Belgium		+ PER203 + PER204 + PER502 + PER605 (> 1959)	
France	+ PER601 ( $\leq$ 1982) + PER602 ( $\leq$ 1982)	+ PER502 - PER601 ( $\leq$ 1982) - PER602 ( $\leq$ 1982) + PER605 (> 1959)	
Germany	+ PER601 + PER602	- PER601 - PER602	
Greece	+ PER601 + PER602	- PER601 - PER602	+ PER502
Ireland	+ PER601 + PER602	- PER602 - PER602	
Italy		+ PER502	
Luxembourg		+ PER502 + PER605 (> 1959)	
Netherlands		+ PER502	
Norway		+ PER502	
Portugal		+ PER502	
Spain		+ PER203 + PER204 + PER502 + PER605	
Switzerland		+ PER502 + PER605 (> 1959)	
United Kingdom		+ PER605 (> 1959)	+ PER502

Table 2: Country and time-specific modifications to the baseline CMP coding category–conflict associations in Table 1.

	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s
<i>Conflict and Issue Salience</i>						
Socioeconomic	42	43	41	40	39	41
(Free Enterprise)	3.0	2.7	2.0	2.1	2.1	1.4
(Welfare State)	5.8	7.0	6.7	7.3	7.4	9.0
Post-materialist/ethnic	10	13	17	21	24	26
(Multiculturalism)	1.2	0.82	0.89	0.65	1.1	1.7
(Centralization)	1.4	2.3	3.0	3.0	2.8	2.9
(Environmental Protection)	0.22	0.90	3.6	5.9	7.2	5.7
Religious	2.2	1.5	2.4	1.9	2.7	2.7
Urban–rural	5.8	3.8	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.7
Foreign policy	11	11	8.0	9.6	9.5	9.5
(EC/EU)	0.93	1.7	1.6	1.9	3.3	3.4
(Special Relationships)	2.3	1.8	0.93	0.89	0.44	0.41
Social Groups	15	13	12	12	10	11
Valence	6.3	5.3	6.5	9.0	10	8.3
Uncoded	13	13	12	7.5	3.7	2.7
<i>Raw Dimensionality</i>						
Ideological Dimensionality	1.3	1.3	1.5	1.7	1.9	1.9
Issue Dimensionality	24	22	22	22	21	19

Table 3: Empirical measures of conflict salience, issue salience and raw space dimensionality by decade based on CMP data from 1950–2003 for Western European countries (2005 for the United Kingdom). Note that the decade labeled “1990s” includes elections in the early 2000s. Salience is measured by the average percentage of political parties’ manifestos devoted to the set of issues, with the salience of sub-sets of issues of ideological conflicts shown in parentheses.




Figure 21: LOWESS smoothed conflict and issue salience using only baseline coding category– conflict associations in four Western European countries, 1950–2003 (2005 for the United Kingdom): socioeconomic (solid black); ethnic (dotted red); foreign policy (long dashed orange); religious (dot-dashed green); urban–rural (two dashed purple); post-materialist (dashed blue); democratic-authoritarian (dot-dashed maroon); valence (solid gray); and social groups (dashed gray).




Figure 22: LOWESS smoothed conflict and issue salience using only baseline coding category– conflict associations in four Western European countries, 1950–2003 (2005 for the United Kingdom): socioeconomic (solid black); ethnic (dotted red); foreign policy (long dashed orange); religious (dot-dashed green); urban–rural (two dashed purple); post-materialist (dashed blue); democratic-authoritarian (dot-dashed maroon); valence (solid gray); and social groups (dashed gray).




Figure 23: LOWESS smoothed conflict and issue salience using only baseline coding category– conflict associations in four Western European countries, 1950–2003 (2005 for the United Kingdom): socioeconomic (solid black); ethnic (dotted red); foreign policy (long dashed orange); religious (dot-dashed green); urban–rural (two dashed purple); post-materialist (dashed blue); democratic-authoritarian (dot-dashed maroon); valence (solid gray); and social groups (dashed gray).




Figure 24: LOWESS smoothed conflict and issue salience using only baseline coding category– conflict associations in four Western European countries, 1950–2003 (2005 for the United Kingdom): socioeconomic (solid black); ethnic (dotted red); foreign policy (long dashed orange); religious (dot-dashed green); urban–rural (two dashed purple); post-materialist (dashed blue); democratic-authoritarian (dot-dashed maroon); valence (solid gray); and social groups (dashed gray).




Figure 25: LOWESS smoothed conflict and issue salience using only baseline coding category– conflict associations in two Western European countries, 1950–2003 (2005 for the United Kingdom): socioeconomic (solid black); ethnic (dotted red); foreign policy (long dashed orange); religious (dot-dashed green); urban–rural (two dashed purple); post-materialist (dashed blue); democratic-authoritarian (dot-dashed maroon); valence (solid gray); and social groups (dashed gray).




Figure 26: LOWESS smoothed conflict and issue salience using only baseline coding category– conflict associations and the combined post-materialism/ethnic conflict in four Western European countries, 1950–2003 (2005 for the United Kingdom): socioeconomic (solid black); post-materialism/ethnic (dotted red); foreign policy (long dashed orange); religious (dot-dashed green); urban–rural (two dashed purple); democratic-authoritarian (dot-dashed maroon); valence (solid gray); and social groups (dashed gray).




Figure 27: LOWESS smoothed conflict and issue salience using only baseline coding category– conflict associations and the combined post-materialism/ethnic conflict in four Western European countries, 1950–2003 (2005 for the United Kingdom): socioeconomic (solid black); post-materialism/ethnic (dotted red); foreign policy (long dashed orange); religious (dot-dashed green); urban–rural (two dashed purple); democratic-authoritarian (dot-dashed maroon); valence (solid gray); and social groups (dashed gray).




Figure 28: LOWESS smoothed conflict and issue salience using only baseline coding category– conflict associations and the combined post-materialism/ethnic conflict in four Western European countries, 1950–2003 (2005 for the United Kingdom): socioeconomic (solid black); post-materialism/ethnic (dotted red); foreign policy (long dashed orange); religious (dot-dashed green); urban–rural (two dashed purple); democratic-authoritarian (dot-dashed maroon); valence (solid gray); and social groups (dashed gray).




Figure 29: LOWESS smoothed conflict and issue salience using only baseline coding category– conflict associations and the combined post-materialism/ethnic conflict in four Western European countries, 1950–2003 (2005 for the United Kingdom): socioeconomic (solid black); post-materialism/ethnic (dotted red); foreign policy (long dashed orange); religious (dot-dashed green); urban–rural (two dashed purple); democratic-authoritarian (dot-dashed maroon); valence (solid gray); and social groups (dashed gray).




Figure 30: LOWESS smoothed conflict and issue salience using only baseline coding category– conflict associations and the combined post-materialism/ethnic conflict in four Western European countries, 1950–2003 (2005 for the United Kingdom): socioeconomic (solid black); post-materialism/ethnic (dotted red); foreign policy (long dashed orange); religious (dot-dashed green); urban–rural (two dashed purple); democratic-authoritarian (dot-dashed maroon); valence (solid gray); and social groups (dashed gray).




Figure 31: LOWESS smoothed raw ideological dimensionality in four Western European countries, 1950–2003 (2005 for the United Kingdom) using the combined post-materialism/ethnic conflict. An alternative measure using the standard effective number of Laakso and Taagepera (1979) is shown in dotted black.




Figure 32: LOWESS smoothed raw ideological dimensionality in four Western European countries, 1950–2003 (2005 for the United Kingdom) using the combined post-materialism/ethnic conflict. An alternative measure using the standard effective number of Laakso and Taagepera (1979) is shown in dotted black.




Figure 33: LOWESS smoothed raw ideological dimensionality in four Western European countries, 1950–2003 (2005 for the United Kingdom) using the combined post-materialism/ethnic conflict. An alternative measure using the standard effective number of Laakso and Taagepera (1979) is shown in dotted black.




Figure 34: LOWESS smoothed raw ideological dimensionality in four Western European countries, 1950–2003 (2005 for the United Kingdom) using the combined post-materialism/ethnic conflict. An alternative measure using the standard effective number of Laakso and Taagepera (1979) is shown in dotted black.




Figure 35: LOWESS smoothed raw ideological dimensionality in two Western European countries, 1950–2003 (2005 for the United Kingdom) using the combined post-materialism/ethnic conflict. An alternative measure using the standard effective number of Laakso and Taagepera (1979) is shown in dotted black.